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The Inflationary and Deflationary Trends 
in the Global Economy in the Light  
of the Long Cycles’ Theory* 
 
Leonid E. Grinin and Andrey V. Korotayev 
 
Abstract 
The danger of deflation has been rather frequently mentioned recently among 
numerous concerns over the European and partly American economies. Ana-
lysts cite the Japanese economy which has been suffering from deflation for the 
last two decades despite the large investments in economy and the govern-
ment's efforts to increase inflation. Similarly, notwithstanding many trillions of 
dollars, euros, pounds and yen that were invested in economies over the past 
few years, the inflation in the Western countries still remains low. 
On the whole, there are reasons to maintain that European countries suffer 
from ‘the Japanese disease’, and this disease can progress or even become 
chronic. The USA, albeit to a lesser extent, has signs of the disease as well. 
As a result, the financial infusions can become permanent, as it happened in 
Japan. The present paper defines reasons of the problem, explains the irregu-
larity of the inflation-deflation processes in the world and also offers some 
forecasts on this basis that the crisis-depressive phase of development in the 
global economy will continue for a relatively long time. Based on our analysis 
of available resources and the theory of long cycles, we suppose that the new 
crisis will begin in 2020–2021. We also suppose that in the next 5–10 years, the 
global economy will continue being in the crisis-depression phase with rather 
sluggish and weak rises. The paper also offers some forecasts for the forthcom-
ing sixth Kondratieff wave (2020 – the 2060/70s), identifies its possible techno-
logical basis and discusses possible consequences of the forthcoming techno-
logical transformations. 
Keywords: Kondratieff waves, long cycles, forecasts, economic future, infla-
tion, deflation, quantitative easing, prices, investments, the World System core, 
periphery, Japanese economy, demand, economic laws. 
                                                          
* This article is an output of a research project implemented as a part of the Basic Research Pro-
gram at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2019 with sup-
port by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project No. 17-02-00521-OGN).   
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The present-day world economy lacks a powerful and developed global mecha-
nism of monetary and nonmonetary measures similar to the regulation at the na-
tional level and this has become one of the main causes of the current global fi-
nancial crisis (see Grinin and Korotayev 2010b). Thus, at the supranational level 
objective economic laws manifest themselves, as before, in the successive short 
and long cycles of economic activity. The cyclic regularity is manifested in the 
booms and recessions of the medium-term Juglar cycles (see, e.g., Juglar 1889 
[1862]; Tugan-Baranovsky 1894, 2008 [1913]; Schumpeter 1939; Grinin and 
Korotayev 2010a, 2012; Grinin, Malkov, and Korotayev 2010; Grinin, Korota-
yev, and Malkov 2010, 2016; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011), and also 
in the inflation and deflation phases of long Kondratieff cycles. Let us note 
that Nikolai D. Kondratieff was the first to make an attempt to present a sys-
tematic theory of such fluctuations of conjuncture (Kondratieff 2002 [1922], 
1993 [1925], 2002 [1926], 2002 [1926], 2002 [1928], 1935, 1984, 1923 
[1988], 2002), but these fluctuations had been noticed much earlier (see, e.g., 
Tooke and Newmarch 1858–1859; Jevons 1884; Sauerbeck 1886; Wicksell 
1898; Parvus 1901, 1908; Lescure 1912, 1932 [1907]; Sombart 1911; Aftal-
ion 1913; van Gelderen 1913; Lenoir 1913; Mukoseyev 1914; Bresciani-
Turroni 1917; Cassel 1918; Kautsky 1912, etc.). 
The present-day world economy possesses some other features which allow 
attributing to it some phenomena which have already gone to the past as a result 
of government regulation at the national level. Some of them were mentioned in 
our works (see, e.g., Grinin 2012a, 2012b; Grinin, Korotayev, and Malkov 2010; 
Grinin, Malkov, and Korotayev 2010; Grinin and Korotayev 2010a, 2012: Ch. 2). 
One can also note that since there is no common world-wide social legislation on 
labor, the laws of severe competition act with respect to most basic commodities 
when the low standard of living and high exploitation contribute to low com-
modity prices. As we shall see below, the cheap export coming from increasing 
number of countries with low standard of living contributes to a partial restrain-
ing of inflation rates in wealthy countries. But it often has no impact on raw mate-
rials. On the whole, there is a disproportion between the raw material producing 
countries and those countries that produce commodities. 
The above-mentioned (and some other) analogies between world economy 
and national economies lacking government regulation can help to explain the 
cycles of world conjuncture and its inflation-deflation trends. 
Recently, alongside with numerous problems in European (and partly Ameri-
can) economies, one quite often mentions the danger of deflation which would 
seem long-forgotten. In the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, from time to 
time the deflation would put pressure on economies, nibbling away at entrepre-
neurs' profit. The deflation meant the decline in rate of return, bankruptcies and 
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other critical events.1 The Great Depression was also connected with the Great 
Deflation and significant drop in prices (see Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. The dynamics of US Consumer Price Index, 1922–1945 (100 = 
1860 level) 
Source: David and Solar 1977: 16–17 (Table 1). 
However, after the Second World War and especially, starting from the 1960s, 
the inflation became the main problem which persisted even in the 1970s when 
one observed a serious decline in Western economy due to the oil prices 
growth. During the economic downturn, prices usually fall or at least do not 
rise; meanwhile, at that period the prices grew against the background of eco-
nomic decline, thus giving rise to a new dangerous phenomenon called ‘stagfla-
tion’. In short, the deflation was forgotten as something remote and as a histori-
                                                          
1 The complaints about deflation were rather widespread, e.g., at the times of ‘the Long Depression’ 
in the USA from 1873 to 1879 (which had been also called the Great Depression before the  
crisis of the 1930s). It was the longest recession in the history of the US economy, so it was even 
longer (though much less severe) than the Great Depression (see, e.g., Fels 1949: 69). It lasted for 
65 months. And the whole period from 1873 to 1897 was also called the Long-wave Depression 
in the US economy. The same refers to Britain of the same period, but the situation there was 
much more difficult in some respects. Thus, Tugan-Baranovsky (2008 [1913]: 195) states that the 
stagnation in British trade had hardly ever been so continuous and destructive for the country as it 
was in the 1880s. ‘The complaints about low prices, reducing all business profit, in the mid-1880s 
were common’ (Ibid.). At the same time it follows from the reports that ‘in some industries the 
production by no means had reduced, but there were complaints of no profit’ (Ibid.). Lescure was 
among the first who quite clearly identified the long depression and deflation between 1873 and 
1893 (Lescure 1932 [1907]: 167–168). 
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cal archaism.2 There appeared theories of secular inflation, organically inherent 
in current economy based on paper money (not dependent on gold) and on cen-
tral banks which make credits of their own will. In the 1980s, the fight against 
inflation required great efforts. Then the 1990s brought a hyperinflation in the 
former socialist countries and in a number of developing countries (see Fig. 2). 
But later the hyperinflation would occur from time to time, for example, as it 
happened in Zimbabwe or Venezuela. 
 
Fig. 2. The inflation rates in the world, in the high income economies, 
and in low and middle income economies, deflator of GDP 
(% a year) 
Source: World Bank 2019: NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG. 
Against this background, Japan was a strange and difficult to explain exception 
(see Fig. 3) as after the crisis of the 1990s (caused by the burst of the housing 
bubble) it began to suffer from deflation. The year of 1994 turned critical in this 
regard. 
                                                          
2 Moreover, Milton Friedman and other economists of this approach even stated that one could have 
easily escaped from the Great Depression if they had actively used quantitative easing. In our opin-
ion, it is generally an illusion. The essence of the Great Depression was not only financial but this 
was a decisive, structural crisis which could not be easily resolved. 
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Fig. 3. Dynamics of the inflation rates (% a year) in Japan, 1980–
2015 
Note: Black circles denote years with negative values (i.e., deflation years). 
Source: IMF 2019. Calculated using consumer prices index. 
After the Second World War, this was the first case when a developed economy 
suffered from the consumer deflation. It was considered as an achievement 
when in some years they succeeded to raise inflation by means of massive cred-
it expansion. The Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe aimed at reaching the 
inflation target of 2 per cent. Until now Japan has not achieved this goal. And 
most important, the cost of the measures aimed to provoke such rate of inflation 
was very high.3 The situation would seem absurd to the countries suffering from 
inflation but the measures taken by the Bank of Japan and the Japanese Gov-
ernment are really amazing in terms of their scale. The most surprising is that 
despite numerous programs of stimulating economy and astronomic sums of 
money spent for these purposes and for bank rescue and despite the fact that  
the Japan public debt is, perhaps, the highest among the developed countries, the 
economic growth in Japan has still remained rather weak for two decades. 
Sometimes it was interrupted by the decline in production (as it happened in 
2014). In the period from 2003 to 2007, the general rise gave impetus to a mod-
erate increase but later the crisis had nearly brought about the collapse of the 
Japanese export and industry. Thus, in Japan one can observe an ‘inverted’ 
stagflation. The economists generally fail to identify the causes of this pro-
longed ‘Japanese disease’ (see, e.g., Hilsenrath 2010). In 1998, to describe this 
                                                          
3 E.g., the sales tax was raised from 5 to 8 per cent. 
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situation Paul Krugman used the term ‘the liquidity trap’ which had been intro-
duced by Keynes. This term describes a situation when monetary instruments 
including lending rates and currency emission do not work and do not stimulate 
the demand (Krugman 2013b).4 Now he considers (not without reason) that other 
Western economies have also fallen into such a trap. But this does not explain 
much. The mechanism of such trap is not clear, Krugman's recommendations 
which the experts call ‘recommendations to blow bubbles’ (Nikolskiy 2013; 
Whitney 2013) seem dangerous.5 The bubbles tend to burst and are rather costly. 
On the whole, the situation seems rather mysterious. There are many fac-
tors that should promote inflation namely: credit rates decrease to the limit (ze-
ro), the Central Bank performs all kinds of open market operations (accumu-
lates debt securities with the purpose of creating additional money liquidity), 
high costs for the state and low profit from the taxes, etc. There are other stimu-
lating actions (in particular, reduction in taxes, direct money distribution, 
changes in banking rules, etc.). But the long-expected inflation does not start. 
But at the same time, other indicators in Japan are quite good, for example, the 
high standard of living and life expectancy. And there is also significant scien-
tific and technological progress. 
One could attribute such a paradoxical situation (when there is a large 
amount of money in economy but inflation is still absent) to the ‘mysterious 
Japanese soul’. Some analysts argue that the Japanese population is getting old 
and people do not want to spend money but prefer to save it (the Japanese have 
substantial savings); besides, contrary to the Europeans and Americans, the 
Japanese are not disposed to consumerism. It makes some sense (especially 
in the context of population ageing) but this is far from the only reason. 
The symptoms of the ‘Japanese disease’ have become apparent in Europe 
(see Fig. 4) and to some extent in the USA. 
                                                          
4 Keynes explained this paradox by the fact that consumers delay their purchases hoping for price 
cutting. But the situation in Japan and in the West is much more complicated than this psycholog-
ical obstacle to expansion of demand. 
5 ‘All this confirms an important conclusion that as I said very early in the crisis, virtue becomes 
vice and prudence is folly. In our world, a responsible behavior is a way to economic failure’ (cit-
ed in Whitney 2013). Krugman proposes to keep the negative interest rates, to raise spending by 
any means and not to be afraid of increasing public debt. He recommends the politicians from the 
USA, Great Britain and other countries with independent currencies to be wiser and not to be 
afraid of default (Krugman 2013a). 
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Fig. 4. The dynamics of inflation rates (% a year) in France and Swit-
zerland, 1980–2018 
Source: IMF 2019. Calculated using consumer prices index. 
Therefore, the reasons lie in the common features of developed economies and 
in the global economy as a whole. 
In fact, in recent years a huge amount of money has been invested in the West-
ern economy. The interest rates have declined to the Japanese (zero) level.6 But 
that has not produced the desired effect: the growth is actually weak and 
a number of European countries even have a negative growth rate. At the same 
time, people are not willing to increase their consumption and number of cred-
its, while the businessmen do not invest actively despite cheaper loans. The 
USA in addition to reduced rates until recently also implemented quantitative 
easing by buying every year government bonds and spending many hundreds of 
billions of dollars (and overall trillions, about 3 trillion over the past years) on 
‘bad’ financial assets. However, even in the USA the efficiency of emissions 
and ‘easings’ is not high. Europe also intends to use quantitative easing (which 
                                                          
6 Moreover, the European Central Bank has recently realized something that used to be just a theo-
retical possibility, namely, imposed a minus 0.1 per cent interest rate on deposits. In other words, 
to encourage the credit expansion, the European Central Bank makes the banks pay the ECB to 
hold their money there. Now the banks should impose the negative interest rates on their clients. 
It means that they will not give money for keeping deposits but will get interests stimulating the 
growth of demand. And in this case the financial mirror-world will come true. 
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is strongly recommended).7 And in fact, the reduction of quantitative easing 
immediately caused problems with developing markets and currencies and later 
with American stock market (especially NASDAQ). The world economy  
is distorted as it has huge disproportions. But the elimination of these dispro-
portions is very painful; so the quantitative easing turns rather helpful in this 
situation, it is like an injection for a drug addict. 
But the strangest thing is that despite trillions of dollars, euros, pounds, 
yen, injected into economy in recent years, the inflation in Western economies 
remains low. And here one should keep in mind that most part of the invested 
money was created out of thin air through the policy conducted by the Central 
Bank. The USA failed to reach the inflation target of 2 per cent (which was 
assumed to be the indicator to stop the quantitative easing). In Europe the infla-
tion is even lower and threatens to turn into deflation. 
All this seems even stranger than at first sight. It is obvious that something 
has fundamentally changed both in the Western and in global economy. But the 
economists fail to define the essence of this change. Where does money go? 
Why does the currency emission fail to accelerate inflation? It is very difficult 
to comprehend the situation. Nevertheless, we would like to present our as-
sumptions about the causes of this situation of ‘disappearance of inflation’. 
First of all, economic laws still are in force but with certain modifications. 
These modifications are related to the development of the economic and finan-
cial globalization and also with the so called financial revolution which made 
the international capital circulation much faster and with more freedom (see, 
e.g., Doronin 2003; Mikhailov 2000; Rubtsov 2000, 2011; Grinin and Korota-
yev 2010a, 2010b). In any case in the conditions of currency emission ‘the dis-
appearance of regular inflation’ means that without this emission either the de-
flationary bias is increasing or inflation gets transformed. Below we will con-
sider both versions. 
Inflation at Different Levels and in Different Respects 
One should take into consideration the fact that inflation is an economic varia-
ble which is measured using particular methods. However, we fail to observe 
the price increase not only within the market basket (especially in the US mar-
ket basket which does not include food and energy). In this respect, one can 
assume that statistics can be manipulated for political benefits. It is rather prob-
able as regards the USA, especially in the period before crisis (see, e.g., Akaev, 
Korotayev, and Fomin 2012). 
                                                          
7 As stated in the International Monetary Fund report (IMF 2014), the extremely low growth rates 
of consumer prices in developed countries, especially in the Eurozone, pose a threat to the global 
economic recovery. 
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Let us suppose that the US statistics is misleading. But why should Japan 
make figures confirm the deflation? On the contrary, they could easily show 
that inflation is rising once it is so desirable. The same refers to Europe. Thus, 
the calculations methodology is of minor importance in this case.  
Taking into account that inflation remains the major threat in developing 
countries, one can assume that today due to the peculiar methods of calculating, 
the Consumer Price Index can strongly depend on the consumption patterns. The 
more food products and essential commodities are included, the more evident 
becomes the consumer inflation. 
Now let us consider several types or levels of inflation as the consumer pric-
es constitute the lower level of inflation while the asset price inflation forms the 
second level. (Let us note that this tendency is not new. Before the Great Depres-
sion of 1929, the level of consumer prices remained the same while the level of 
asset prices was increasing very fast). In 2013, the US GDP rose by 1.9 per cent, 
the inflation was 1.1 per cent, and stock market increased by 35 per cent. 
Thus, if the amount of circulating money increases more than the economic 
growth requires it and there is no inflation, it means that money goes to the 
sectors where inflation is not measured (as an inflation). However, in these 
sectors either the asset value grows or the prices maintain a stable level or in-
crease, or the bubbles are blown, etc. These can be stock markets (shares and 
securities), raw material markets, real estate markets, etc. Meanwhile, the value 
of assets becomes an independent component which is not closely related to the 
actual situation at the enterprises.  
Global and National Inflation 
The expanding financial and economic globalization together with growing 
financial sector in general and financial services as a part of GDP (and with the 
absence of obstacles for a rapid capital transfer) has led to the situation when 
the emission of money in some places (centers) can cause inflation in other 
countries. However, the emission of money affects national economies, and this 
impact is in a way similar to the increase in gold production during the gold-
standard period. Indeed, the rapid increase in gold production between the 
1850s and 1860s in California and Australia pushed the prices up in many 
countries. However, contrary to nineteenth-century situation when prices grew 
fastest in the places of gold mines, today (taking into account that money flows 
can be immediately transferred for many thousand kilometers) the consumer 
inflation may not be perceived in the centers of emission (as the movement of 
air may be hardly perceived at the epicenter of a typhoon). 
Besides, one should take into account the international division of labor. 
On the one hand, the Western countries produce and supply capitals and world 
currency to all economies of the world (but if a certain part of it is created ‘out 
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of thin air’, then there may appear a peculiar effect of the simultaneous export of 
inflation and deflation); on the other hand, the developing countries pro- 
duce cheap consumer goods which are in growing numbers supplied to the de-
veloped countries. Increasing amounts of money from the core countries go to 
other countries and affect inflation there in different ways.8 This can be called 
an exported inflation. At the same time, the Western countries get cheap import 
from the developing countries and this also contributes to low inflation. But  
we should note that export of inflation is not always bad. On the contrary, un-
der the current situation it can significantly stimulate the economic growth 
(since the Keynesian times the moderate inflation is considered as a catalyst for 
the economic growth). However, the dependence on the fluctuations of eco-
nomic flows makes the developing markets extremely vulnerable when any 
external change can cause deterioration. 
As we have already noted, the major part of emission goes not to consum-
ers' expenses but flows to assets and contributes to the increase in raw materials 
(‘commodities’) prices (although this often does not correlate with the econom-
ic situation).9 However, in the second half of 2014 the oil prices started to 
plunge, which can probably strengthen the deflationary trend. It is very im-
portant to realize that on the global scale it is just these capitals that support 
high oil and commodity prices which would drop otherwise. Thus, the emission 
spreads all over the world without visible manifestations, but this imposes in-
flation tax on all countries and stimulates the growth of resource economies 
(including Russia's) sustained via high prices. Thus, due to the pointed factors, 
the characteristics and manifestations of inflation change and gain a more glob-
al character. Inflation becomes a part of the international division of labor but 
under the conditions of labor division the benefits and problems are not equally 
distributed between the actors and countries and depend on the characteristics 
of a system. Consequently, with a certain level of average world inflation there 
may be deflation in some countries while the others will suffer from high infla-
tion (thus, in addition to the internal factors the global ones can also produce 
a certain effect).10 
                                                          
8 At the same time, the Central Bank's low interest rates make almost every financial operation 
profitable and that is the reason of tendency to conservatism (to invest into government bonds or 
some shares) which leads to deflation. Thus, the low interest rates contrary to the expectations can 
create a deflationary spiral.  
9 Money does not fall directly into people's hands (in the USA the taxes rose and tax collection was 
tightened) but goes directly to the banks and financial companies. If 85 billion dollars were 
monthly given in the form of aid, the acceleration of inflation would be inevitable.  
10 The development of globalization and emergence of new cheap manufacturers can produce an 
effect similar to the decline in crop and food prices in the 19th century (in the 1870s and 1890s). 
Just as the export of Russian and American cheap wheat in the 1870s and 1880s gave the Europe-
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The global capital flows have a great influence on the value of currency 
causing its devaluation and revaluation irrespective of internal factors and trade 
balance and these fluctuations also affect inflationary processes. The peculiari-
ties of international monetary system make the countries with soft currencies 
transmit inflation to their own territory. Forced to accumulate foreign exchange 
reserves, they emit national currencies in connection with them and thus accel-
erate domestic inflation (in particular, Rothbard pointed this in his works 
[Rothbard 1977, 1994, 1995, 2002, 2005]). 
Why does Capital Flow from the Western Countries?  
If the return level is low, then capitals search for more profitable applications. 
As a result, the issued funds are invested not only in national economy but also 
in other national and world assets and become the source of capital exports and 
‘fertilize’ the developing countries' growth.11 In 1990 when its economy started 
to fight with inflation, Japan had become the largest capital exporter and the 
largest loaner. The economic improvements in East Asia were supported by  
the Japanese (as well as American and European) funds for which their domes-
tic capital markets had become tight. In addition to the corporations' own prof-
its, the Japanese Central Bank's low interest credits together with the emission 
obviously contributed to such powerful outflow of the Japanese capital (see 
Bonner and Wiggin 2003). In general, in the 1990s, ten economic development 
programs were launched totaling 100 trillion yen or about 900 billion dollars 
(Powell 2003: 111; Herberer 2003: 145; Bonner and Wiggin 2003). The same 
refers to other Western economies. 
The export of capital under low interest rates is the export of deflation (and 
the exporting countries become the source of deflation) which in other (import-
ing) countries can transform into the inflation (if the latter issue their own cur-
rency for imported foreign capital as, e.g., they do this in Russia, China, etc.). 
The more intermediaries there are, the more vigorous can be the transformation. 
It is similar to the situation with food when products are purchased from the 
farmers at low prices but in the process of selling to the ultimate consumer the 
prices significantly increase. 
In general, the growth of the financial sector is not accidental. In the ab-
sence of the golden anchor (i.e., gold standard) the necessity to save money 
from devaluation and increase capital (to give dividends to the owners of the 
capital) requires a huge amount of highly qualified specialists. The new tech-
nologies of rapid transfer and multiple insurance (hedging) of money impede 
                                                                                                                                
an workers cheaper food but at the same time put pressure on the economy, today the consumers 
benefit from the Chinese and other exports, which puts pressure on economy. 
11 The low-interest credits quite often obtained in the countries with artificially low rates are used 
for the purpose of buying more profitable assets in other countries. 
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the deflation of the assets and contribute to some leveling of the inflation in the 
world. However, recently we generally observe a more evident transfer  
of inflation from the developed to developing countries than in the opposite 
direction. 
The World Deflationary Bias and Mechanisms 
One can also explain the weak inflation in Western countries by the strong 
global deflationary processes and mechanisms which reduce inflation caused by 
huge emissions. If not for the emissions, the deflation would be more clearly 
manifested in Western economies. The experts of the international financial 
organizations realize this quite well and press to continue emission. What are 
the reasons to maintain that at present the deflationary trend prevails? 
Firstly, we should note that at present we observe the downswing phase of 
the fifth Kondratieff wave (see Tables 1–2 and Figs 5–6). Kondratieff himself 
identified the following long waves and their phases (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Long waves and their phases, identified by Kondratieff 
Long wave 
number 
Long wave  
phase 
Dates of the beginning Dates of the end 
I 
A: upswing  The end of the 1780s –  
beginning of the 1790s 
1810–1817 
B: downswing 1810–1817 1844–1851 
II 
A: upswing   1844–1851 1870–1875 
B: downswing  1870–1875 1890–1896 
III 
A: upswing   1890–1896 1914–1920 
B: downswing  1914–1920  
The subsequent students of Kondratieff cycles identified additionally the fol-
lowing long-waves in the post-World War I period (see Table 2). 
Table 2. ‘Post-Kondratieff’ long waves and their phases 
Long wave 
number 
Long wave  
phase 
Dates of the beginning Dates of the end 
III A: upswing  1890–1896 1914–1928/2912 
B: downswing 1914 to 1928/29 1939–1950 
IV A: upswing  1939–1950 1968–1974 
B: downswing 1968–1974 1984–1991 
V A: upswing  1984–1991 2005–2008? 
B: downswing 2005–2008? ? 
                                                          
12 The most noticeable variation in dates is observed at the threshold of the A and B phases of the 
3rd Kondratieff wave. 
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Source: Mandel 1980; Dickson 1983; van Duijn 1983: 155; Wallerstein 1984; Goldstein 
1988: 67; Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1995: 8; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Berend 
2002: 308; Bobrovnikov 2004: 47; Pantin and Lapkin 2006: 283–285, 315; Ayres 2006; 
Linstone 2006: Fig. 1; Tausch 2006a, 2006b: 101–104; Thompson 2000, 2007: Table 5; 
Jourdon 2008: 1040–1043; Korotayev, Zinkina, and Bogevolnov 2011. The last dating 
(2008) is suggested by the authors of the present paper (Grinin and Korotayev 2012; 
Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011; Korotayev and Tsirel 2010а, 2010b, 2010c; Korota-
yev, Khaltourina, and Bojevolnov 2010: 188–227). Close datings are also suggested by 
some other scholars (see Lynch 2004: 230; Pantin and Lapkin 2006: 315; Akaev 2010; 
Akaev and Sadovnichiy 2010). 
 
Fig. 5. The fourth and fifth K-waves in World GDP annual growth rate 
dynamics 
Source: Maddison 2010 (1940–2008); World Bank 2019 (2009–2018). 
 
Fig. 6. The USA producer price index in gold and oil equivalent during 
the fourth and fifth K-waves 
Source: BP 2010; Scheglov 2009; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011: 77. 
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The deflationary and depressive tendencies increase at the downswing phases 
(see Grinin and Korotayev 2012, 2014; Grinin 2012a, 2013; Korotayev and Grin-
in 2012, 2014 for details about K-waves, their phases, and periodization). De-
flationary factors persist even during the periods of recession and depression 
(they can only be mitigated). In the previous period between the 1990s and 
2000s the additional emission of dollars and the deficit of balance of payment 
played the role of California's gold (in the period from 1850 to the 1860s) and 
increased the inflation in some places and sectors while blowing ‘bubbles’.  
Secondly, inflation is multi-faceted. In particular, one should distinguish 
cost inflation and demand inflation. The cost inflation can have severe conse-
quences especially under non-competitive conditions. The stagflation of the 
1970s was connected with cost inflation but not with demand inflation. There 
was no alternative to oil then.13 However, globalization has undermined some 
opportunities for the cost inflation even in the services sector since the rapid 
means of communication made it possible to outsource the most expensive ser-
vices. The demand inflation mainly depends on the growing demand. However, 
there is no such growth in the developed countries. Thus, the absence of defla-
tion during the B-phase of the 4th K-wave looks now as an exceptional phe-
nomenon.  
Thirdly, one should consider not only the emission of money but also the 
factors that level it, namely: 
a) the fact that in the period of crisis many capitals were burned or frozen 
(‘garbage assets’). As we noted earlier, the crisis of 2008–2009 can be called 
the crisis of overproduction of money (Grinin 2009). The current emission par-
tially substitutes money for these garbage assets. If additional money was not 
issued, prices would drop and the remaining ‘bubbles’ would completely blow 
out. In this case, the real deflation would start and restore the health of the 
world economy but at the same time it would inflict numerous losses (including 
those for the raw commodity exporters).14 During the previous decades, there 
was a tremendous increase in monetary assets. Thus, over 20 years (between 
1980 and 1999) the world market capitalization increased by 13 times while the 
world's aggregate GDP increased only by 2.6 times. As a result, the ratio of 
capitalization to GDP increased from 23 per cent to 118 per cent. In the 2000s, 
the capitalization increased not that much, it only doubled, and its growth rates 
correlated with the GDP growth rates (see Sulakshin 2012: 226–227). Howev-
er, the emission of derivatives was increasing rapidly, and in 2007 and 2008 it 
                                                          
13 Inflation in Russia is in many ways related just to cost inflation due to natural monopolies. 
14 The decrease in prices, e.g., for aluminum, has led to the shutdown of some factories in Russia 
and some other countries. A more significant decrease could lead to the world (and national) GDP 
decline. That used to be the pattern of Juglar cycles. Now we do not observe the decrease but at 
the same time the growth is lacking either. The money injections act in a non-cyclical manner and 
are not the engine of the growth. 
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exceeded 2.2 trillion dollars per year: yet, due to the tightening of legislation 
and some other factors the volume of their emission is reduced.  
b) The necessity to support global trade. While in the 19th century gold 
played the role of world money, at present dollars and partly other currencies 
perform this function. Therefore, some amount of money should be additionally 
invested into the world economy annually. Let us recall that in recent decades 
the world trade growth rates surpassed the growth rates of the world economy 
(see Fig. 7); and thus, a larger amount of world money has been needed. 
 
Fig. 7. The relative growth dynamics of the world GDP and the world 
trade (100 = the level of 1980) 
Source: IMF 2019. 
Against this background, the USA, Japan and some other countries get benefits 
and this is a situation similar to the 19th century when the USA and Australia 
got extra bonuses from growth in gold mining. The world economy growth 
even by 2 per cent per year means an increasing demand for dollars, hundreds 
billions of dollars which are invested through the emission. 
c) Hoarding means of accumulation and their removal from circulation. At 
the global scale, it took a form of accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
which reached tremendous volumes and this contributes to the absorption of 
spare money. Over the last decade a number of countries have accrued their 
international reserves. That is the reason why the inflation is so low in the 
countries-issuers, but it is high in other countries (as we have already noted,  
the accumulation of foreign currency reserves is used by such countries to sup-
port the issue of their own currency). Besides, these countries accumulate  
a certain part of the reserves and different national funds in US and other coun-
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tries' government bonds. Hoarding is expressed in private savings (up to hun-
dred billions of dollars in cash are annually spent on these purposes), etc. 
d) The competition for goods and services export to the developed coun-
tries (e.g., tourism can become cheaper due to new markets with cheap services 
and undervalued currency). 
e) From time to time the circulation of money slows down, so the amount 
of money compensates for decelerating velocity of its circulation (according to 
Fisher equation). Taking into account the current slowdown of the world trade 
(and of the world financial services) and corresponding deceleration of the cur-
rency in circulation, the investment of extra capitals into international finance 
does not produce a congruent effect on inflation and even fails to keep the pric-
es from decreasing. But in general the deceleration of the world trade has a 
negative impact on economic growth rates. 
Deflationary and Depressive Factors Specific to the Western 
World 
All other things being equal, the weak economic growth is mainly explained by 
the fact that the main reserves of growth were exhausted in respective societies. 
The evident reserve, which appeared to be mostly depleted in Japan in the 
1990s, was demography. In the 1990s, the process of decline of economically 
active population began (see, e.g., Vimont 2000) which continues until now 
(see Fig. 8), but at present we also observe a natural decline in the population.  
 
Fig. 8. The dynamics of working age population (20–65 years) in Ja-
pan, 1980–2015 
Source: UN Population Division 2019. 
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Thus, one of the main problems is the population ageing, its slow growth, or 
even depopulation in developed economies and this contributes to the weaken-
ing of the natural foundation for the economic growth. In the case of population 
decline, the percentage of working-age population also decreases and thus, the 
economic growth gains different character and requires extra efforts (at present 
Russia has encountered a similar situation which contributed to a sharp decline 
of growth rates). In the situation of population ageing, when old people mainly 
have no problems with purchasing accommodation and durable goods (the 
problems of basic needs have already been solved) and think that they should 
save money for bad times, the stimuli for the economic growth change. The 
example of Japan demonstrates that in this case a country can exist even 
without economic growth just by transforming the economic structure. So, 
there arises a new situation when there is no stagnation, but there is no 
growth either. This is an entirely new situation. We do not know how long it 
will last. Of course, to a great extent it is, probably, artificially created, as the 
GDP growth rate is not an absolute indicator of an actual growth. Anyway, the 
situation remains alarming. 
The next cause of ‘the Japanese disease’ is a very high standard of living 
which can hardly be adapted to decreasing growth rates. In Europe, for exam-
ple, the number of working hours per worker is much smaller than in the USA 
and Japan. The drive to high standards of living, obviously, prevents invest-
ment and savings growth. In the USA, there are much fewer social guarantees 
than in Europe and this has a positive effect on the economic activity, but they 
also tend to increase there. In general, population ageing together with social 
guarantees available for the electorate makes a tough problem of budget deficit 
and government debt due to low growth rates. And this is another reason why 
‘the Japanese disease’ can exacerbate in Europe.  
The third reason is that these countries are transforming into rentiers due to 
their specialization within the World System on the export of capital and re-
ceiving dividends and also due to their strong financial centers and financial 
sector. All this reminds the situation in Great Britain in the late 19th – early 20th 
centuries when capital export and savings were sources of subsistence for many 
people for whom deflation was profitable. At the same time, the pound was 
stable. And now the United States live as a rentier largely due to the exception-
al position of dollar in the international monetary system. High incomes from 
the foreign assets do not contribute to the growth of domestic economic activity 
and GDP. 
The fourth reason is that the main reserve of the economic growth in Eu-
rope, the USA and Japan is the technological growth. However, in the situation 
of active export of capital and continued industry export (although there is evi-
dence of the homewards stream) this factor is limited in its action at least until 
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the development of new breakthrough technologies. The insufficient invest-
ments give no growth in demand.15 In Europe this is primarily connected with a 
hard economic situation and budget cuts; this is similar in Japan, with its ageing 
population which is less apt to innovations and more concentrated on saving 
money for bad times. The signs of ‘the Japanese disease’ begin to show up. In 
the USA, there is also an obvious tendency to repay debts and decrease the 
number of credits. Energy cost reduction, increase of taxes and insurance 
payments, deficit and trade balance reduction are used as supplementary anti-
inflationary measures in the USA. Low interest rates on deposits also cause 
low inflation (and the outflow of capital). The most important sign (not only 
in the USA but also in Europe) is low credit rates which reduce cost inflation 
(on the contrary, in Russia and China the high credit rates increase cost infla-
tion). 
The fifth reason is the deindustrialization in developed economies in which 
the financial services and flows account for a larger share. And the service 
economy significantly differs from the previous type, similarly, as the industrial 
economy differed from the industrializing one. For example, while the crisis in 
1970–1980 was associated with oil prices growth, the current crisis arises from 
the sharp decline in oil prices and it can make many businesses bankrupt. At 
present housing bubbles and other bubbles pose major threats because the emis-
sions flow primarily into these financial structures. To some extent this is simi-
lar to pre-industrial and early industrial economy where basic capitals were 
separated from the economy (finance would concentrate mainly in serving pub-
lic debt and large-scale trade). Bursting bubbles are unprofitable because this 
leads to bankruptcies and requires new niches to save and grow capitals.  
                                                          
15 In 2012, global FDI declined by 18 per cent and amounted US$ 1.35 trillion. UNCTAD indicated 
that in 2013 FDI remained close to the 2012 level, with an upper limit of US$ 1.45 trillion. The 
recovery will be more prolonged than it has been expected mainly due to the global economic in-
stability and political uncertainty. With the account of revival of investors' mid-term assurance, it 
was expected that the FDI flows could reach the amount of US$ 1.6 trillion in 2014 and US$ 1.8 
trillion in 2015. There are still considerable risks associated with this growth scenario. The FDI 
outflows from the developed countries dropped to the level close to the level of 2009. The uncer-
tain economic prospects make the developed countries' TNCs to maintain their wait-and-see ap-
proach with respect to new investments or to divest foreign assets, rather than undertake major 
international expansion. In 2012, 22 of the 38 developed countries experienced a decline in FDI 
outflow which constituted 23 per cent of the general decline (UNCTAD 2013). FDI flows to de-
veloped economies sharply declined. FDI inflows to developed economies declined by 32 per 
cent and amounted 561 billion dollars, this level was lastly achieved almost 10 years ago. There 
was a significant decline in FDI inflows in most developed countries, in particular, in the Europe-
an Union which accounts for two thirds of the global FDI reduction. According to UNCTAD re-
port, despite the struggle against tax havens their number increases which reduces expenses on 
business; the number of countries offering favorable tax conditions for SPEs (special-purpose en-
tities) is also increasing.  
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The sixth reason is the erosion of the middle class and growing inequality. 
Especially it is typical of the USA with its weak development of social system, 
because extra revenues from monetary emission means increasing or sustaining 
incomes of narrow class of people which leads to growing social stratification 
in developed countries.16 This can increase the risk of social unrest. But we also 
observe a growing social stratification in other developed countries (see, e.g., 
Ortmans et al. 2017). This tendency is typical of the largest Western states. 
Thus, the erosion of middle class provokes deflationary processes as the house-
hold incomes decrease (or stop growing), while in developing countries, on the 
contrary, the growing middle class affects positively the inflation rates.  
Implications for Future Global Economic Development  
On the whole, there are reasons to maintain that European countries suffer from 
‘the Japanese disease’, and this disease can progress or become chronic. The 
USA, although to a lesser extent, also demonstrates some symptoms of this 
disease. As a result, financial injections can become constant, as this has al-
ready happened in Japan.  
The main problem is that the driving force of the growth weakens and the 
economies cannot grow without emissions and financial injections. The worst is 
that they cannot grow even with financial injections; at best they can demon-
strate a sluggish development. As a result, the real business forces move to the 
spheres of financial and other technologies and this leads to decreasing invest-
ments into real technologies. In the situation of economic difficulties everyone 
requires emission on a growing scale. So, there starts a certain emission race 
among different states. However, in the situation of relatively low demand the 
emission will hardly bring a rapid increase of inflation, dollar devaluation, or 
other results. But, of course, it will leave its mark. However, we will most likely 
see the consequences in a few years and as usual they will come unexpectedly. 
The continuous accumulation of money and financial instruments (especially 
combined with their accelerated circulation or weakening of deflationary pro-
cesses) can become a detonator. This situation will lead to the bursting of an-
other financial bubble that can cause another large-scale crisis because the debt 
and emission overhang will significantly increase by that time. Besides, the 
central banks' manipulations cause remittance of money flows to the specula-
tive channel (due to the actual repayment of debts by means of emission and 
repurchase of ‘bad’ assets) which significantly distorts proportions and creates 
                                                          
16 In developing countries, on the contrary, the smaller role of financial sector leads to the growth in 
incomes of most people, so there is a growth of the middle class promoted by real economic 
growth and growing significance of the intellectuals. 
The Inflationary and Deflationary Trends 74
a large overhang in the form of overvalued exchange assets which are most 
likely to burst. Of course, it is very difficult to forecast the time, place and the 
trigger of that burst. One should take into account that many social funds and 
capital owners invest in stocks and this fact will make the collapse hard for 
everyone. 
Thus, probably, the cycle of monetary over-accumulation within the World 
System has not finished yet and it will take several years before the abscess 
breaks somewhere. The situation can be exacerbated if more countries and their 
central banks (including the ECB) are involved in the process of quantitative 
easing and the USA and Japan fail to cope with this process in the way they 
intend.  
In the next few years the deflationary factors will prevail or even increase. 
According to Paul Krugman (in Hilsenrath 2010), it is time to focus on the sta-
ble trend of decrease and on its consequences. After all, everything indicates 
that we will have to deal with repressed economy for a long time. Remarkable 
efforts and reforms will be needed to overcome the economic depression. The 
time will show if Western countries are ready for such sacrifices.   
Thus, on the basis of our analysis of available resources and the theory of 
long cycles, we arrive at the conclusion that in the next 5–10 years, the global 
economy will continue being in the crisis-depression phase with rather sluggish 
and weak rises. This conclusion is implied by the long cycle theory.  
We suggest that the A-phase of the 5th K-wave ended with the start of the 
global crisis in 2008, when the B-phase started. In this case – taking into ac-
count the active search throughout the World System for effective anti-crisis 
measures – the duration of the B-phase should not be more than two ‘Juglars’, 
and it is very likely that the duration of J-cycles within the cluster should not be 
very long. We should also take into account the tendency for the duration of  
B-phases to decrease. But at the same time B-phase shall not be less than two 
‘Juglars’, whereas, as we have seen, short J-cycles are less typical for B-phases 
than for A-phases. Therefore, we can suggest a tentative forecast that the pre-
sent B-phase of the 5th K-wave will have duration of 14 to 18 years. Thus, the 
5th K-wave downswing will continue till the mid-2020s, and the problem of 
deflation, apparently, will be quite serious till that time.  
Forecasts  
Recent developments in the global economy, commodity and stock markets, as 
well as in the policies of central banks indicate the intensification of depressive 
and deflationary effects. We assume that the world economy is moving toward 
a new financial or financial-economic crisis. But unlike 2008, this will be prob-
ably not a sudden collapse, but rather a slow retraction into the recession and 
Leonid E. Grinin and Andrey V. Korotayev 75 
financial contraction for some segments of the economy, which will have a 
cumulative impact on the financial sector and other areas of the economy. 
We assume that more obvious signs of crisis (when it will be possible to 
speak about the crisis, not its precursors) may manifest itself in 2020–2021. 
Recently, more and more economists predict an imminent recession in these 
years17. At the same time, it is likely that we will have a ‘sticky’ recession 
without major failures, but without the possibility to change the situation for 2–
3 years or even more.  
On the one hand, various negative developments in the economy in 2015 
and 2016 are in certain moments reminiscent of the situation in 2006–2007 
(when one could observe the beginning of the mortgage crisis, increased vola-
tility in the stock markets and other harbingers of the crisis, which, however, 
seemed surmountable and transient). On the other hand, the situation now is 
significantly different. As we have mentioned above, the period up to 2006–
2008 can be considered as the upward phase of the 5th Kondratieff wave. Then 
we can talk about a downward phase of this wave. For the upward phase is 
characterized by the growth of inflation and price bubbles (this is what we ob-
served in the early 2000s). As noted by researchers of Kondratieff waves (see, 
e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2010a, 2012, 2014), the crisis at the turn of a Kon-
dratieff wave (between its upward and downward phases) is particularly pro-
found. This also explains the large scale of the crisis of recent years (as well as 
the crisis of 1974–1975).  
Crises of the downward phases of Kondratieff waves are of a different 
character, they are less pronounced (collapses and busts might be absent or may 
not be as strong), as the preceding booms are relatively weak. But these crises 
are more stubborn and protracted. We assume that the next crisis (which will 
begin in 2019–2020) will be of this kind.  
Deflation is characteristic of the downswing phases of Kondratieff waves. 
At the downswing phase of the 4th Kondratieff wave (in the 1970s and early 
1980s) deflation was not visible because it was prevented by the rise in oil pric-
es, as well as by the departure from the gold standard. However, during the 
downswing phase of the 5th K-wave (i.e., just at present) deflationary phenom-
ena began to appear as companions of the Kondratieff wave downswing. Un-
precedented actions of central banks resorting to the emission in a variety of 
                                                          
17 The recession should have occurred earlier, in 2017–2018, but the election of Donald Trump as 
president has made significant adjustments to the development of the current economic cycle. 
First of all, tax reduction provided significant support to the U.S. economy. In addition, the U.S. 
budget deficit began to increase. There was also a very high level of credit pumping in Europe 
and China. Needless to say that there was unprecedented and evident support for the stock market 
provided by major banks and, most likely, by the Federal Reserve. Tax remissions and amnesty 
for the return of profits of major US companies gave them the opportunity to increase the so-
called stock buyback and thus influence the price increase.  
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forms to saturate the economy with cheap money do not let the deflationary 
trend to develop fully, though in general it is becoming increasingly evident. 
Deflation begins to be also observed in some developing economies, including 
China – though a few years ago inflation was one of the main concerns of  
the Chinese administration. We expect further strengthening of deflationary 
phenomena (of course, with fluctuations and variations in different countries). 
The strengthening of deflationary processes can be accelerated by the exhaus-
tion of national funds of oil-producing countries, by the reduction of investment 
in companies producing oil and other raw materials, as well as by a number of 
other circumstances. Strengthening of these trends can be expressed in the fu-
ture collapse of price bubbles. 
In recent years, we could observe the collapse of a few price bubbles that 
remained after 2008 due to the quantitative easing programs of the FRS. In this 
context, we assume that oil prices and prices of other raw materials is unlikely 
to grow significantly in the next three to four years, although some may rise 
(due to withdrawal of the less efficient players from the market). That is, they 
will not nearly reach the maximum levels that were two or three years ago. 
Currently a very few bubbles can be observed in the world markets. These 
are some stock assets' bubbles, the dollar bubble (that increases the cost of the 
already existing great difficulties for the development of all economies, includ-
ing the United States), as well as national debts' bubbles, since government 
bonds have become a haven for investors.  
In this context, we assume that the stocks indices will be rather volatile in 
the forthcoming years, but the overall trend will be generally bearish (though 
with rather significant fluctuations). Thus, the ‘stock bubble’ will gradually 
(but not abruptly) deflate, possibly reaching as a result the level of 2009. Such 
a trend will contribute to the reduction in corporate profitability, which we are 
already witnessing in 2017.  
As regards the US dollar, we can say that even though objectively its cost 
is too high, the next year and a half we do not expect its significant decline, as 
long as the Fed continues to insist on raising rates and the US economy contin-
ues to grow (although at a relatively slow pace). Therefore, the dollar will re-
main a safer asset for investors.  
But during the crisis forecasted above, we can expect the fall of the dollar 
relative to other currencies due to the deteriorating economic situation in the 
United States and the corresponding actions by the Fed to ease the monetary 
policy. This, incidentally, may somehow counteract deflationary trends (but not 
in a radical way).  
As for the government bond bubble, the situation will be ambiguous. Cur-
rently, due to the sharp decline in areas of favorable capital investment, which 
we assume will continue further, the primary aim of investors is to preserve 
their capitals. This is especially true with respect to conservative investors such 
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as pension and other social and national funds. The number of those investors 
who prefer riskier operations, is unlikely to grow, it will rather decline, as is 
already evidenced by the problems of many hedge funds.  
Nevertheless, one would expect that the absence of embedding spheres 
beneficial to investors, firstly to support the gold market and possibly other 
precious metals, and in the future these markets will grow. And secondly, it can 
enhance the mobility of the capital, which would seek to come to any market 
with expected higher profits, but also it will contribute to the loss of capital as 
a result of falls or drops in these markets. An example with Shanghai and other 
stock markets in China shows how this can be.  
In connection with the above, the bubble of government bonds is likely to 
continue growing (even against the background of negative interest rates). 
However, these will not be government bonds of all the states. Obviously, the 
debt market of government obligations can be divided into the market with reli-
able bonds and less reliable ones.  
Accordingly, the market of reliable (American, German, Japanese) gov-
ernment bonds will be inflated (though central banks will become more and 
more important holders of them in connection with the policy of quantitative 
easing). As for the bond market of less reliable states (that has recovered from 
the crisis of 2009–2011), it is not likely to grow for a long time, whereas later it 
may turn out to be a source of a new general crisis.  
In general, we note that today the Western economies are between Scylla 
of weak economic growth with low interest rates and Charybdis of over-
indebtedness, which can threaten the state default. It is a kind of a trap from 
which exit is difficult. In general, by trying through the increase in the national 
debt and all kinds of financial technologies (quantitative easing, zero and nega-
tive rates) to support the economy, Western countries have begun to ‘eat away’ 
their financial superiority. We called the crisis of 2008 the crisis of overproduc-
tion of money (Grinin 2009). This is confirmed to a significant extent. As we 
have just said, today the main problem is the lack of profitable and/or safe in-
vestments for monetary mass and financial derivatives that have increased dra-
matically since 1990. Therefore, the financial systems of a number of countries 
have been transformed into delayed-action mines. These are countries whose 
financial systems are parts of the Western monetary system, but whose eco-
nomic systems are not as highly developed as the one of, say, Germany, which 
create greater risks of the crisis (Greece and the countries of Southern Europe 
are rather indicative in this respect). 
As we have found, as a result of almost any Juglar crisis one can observe 
emergence, significant modification (or diffusion) of new financial technolo-
gies, which are then used to prevent or mitigate crises (Grinin and Korotayev 
2010a). Today the role of such technologies is played by quantitative easing 
with purchase of government obligations and negative interest rates. It can be 
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assumed that as a result of a new crisis (that we have forecasted) their use may 
increase. However, they are unlikely to produce a radical effect. 
Today there is a unique situation in many countries, when their debt is in-
creasing, and the debt service costs decline; this looks beneficial in the short 
term, but in reality drives respective countries into a trap.  
Firstly, their own pension and social funds suffer, as they cannot (as a re-
sult of lower bonuses) ensure the growth of pension and social savings for tens 
of millions of future pensioners.  
Secondly, this situation worsens the possibility of a new round of economic 
growth since the emergence of new areas of profitable investment will inevita-
bly raise the cost of credit, and with this the service of colossal public debt will 
be very difficult, and sometimes even impossible. This situation gives us fur-
ther reason to believe that the forecasted crisis and depression (in 2020–2021 
and subsequent years) will be rather prolonged. As in the period between 2010 and 
2015, there will be some rises in these years, but they are likely to be sluggish.  
Overall, the end of the depression is likely to be associated with the com-
pletion of the downswing phase of the 5th Kondratieff wave and the beginning 
of the upward phase of the 6th K-wave (around the 2020s, most likely, in the 
mid-2020s, but probably earlier). Thus, in the 2020s and 2030s we will expect 
the upswing of the forthcoming 6th Kondratieff wave, which will introduce the 
sixth technological paradigm (system). As is known, for this forecasted sixth 
technological paradigm they widely use abbreviation NBIC-technology 
(or NBIC-convergence), where NBIC = nano-bio-information and cognitive 
(see Lynch 2004; Bainbridge and Roco 2005; Dator 2006). There are also those 
scientists (e.g., Jotterand 2008) who consider another system of technologies to 
be leading in the future – GRAIN (Genomics, Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, 
Nano-technology). However, we believe that this complex will be larger. 
Moreover, we assume that this sixth technological paradigm will organically 
grow into a new technological revolution, which we call Cybernetic (Grinin A. 
and Grinin L. 2015a). The drivers of the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolu-
tion will be medical, additive (e.g., 3 D-printers), nano- and bio- technologies, 
robotics, IT, cognitive sciences, which will together form a sophisticated sys-
tem of self-regulating production. We can denote this complex as MANBRIC-
technologies.18 However, all those revolutionary technological changes will be 
connected, first of all, with breakthroughs in medicine and related technologies 
(for more details see Grinin A. and Grinin L. 2015b; Grinin L. and Grinin A. 
2016, 2014; Grinin and Korotayev 2015; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch 2016; 
Grinin, Grinin, and Korotayev 2017a, 2017b). 
                                                          
18 The order of the letters in the acronym does not reflect our understanding of the relative im-
portance of areas of the complex. E.g., biotechnologies will be more important than nanotechnol-
ogies, let alone additive technologies. The order is determined simply by the convenience of pro-
nunciation. 
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Then, given the favorable conditions as they have been mentioned above, 
during this wave the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution will begin. 
In such a situation, it is possible to assume that the 6th K-wave's A-phase  
(2020 – the 2050s) will have much stronger manifestation and last longer than 
that of the 5th one due to more dense combination of technological generations. 
And since the Cybernetic Revolution will evolve, the 6th K-wave's downward 
B-phase (2050 – the 2060/70s), is expected to be not so depressive, as those 
during the third or fifth waves. In general, during this K-wave (2020 – the 
2060/70s) the Scientific and Information Revolution will come to an end, and 
the scientific and cybernetic production principle will acquire its mature shape. 
Thus, the management of the economy should reach a new level. K-waves 
appeared at a certain phase of global evolution and they are likely to disappear 
at its certain phase.  
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